

Unofficial translation.

Address given by Prime Minister Olof Palme at the  
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Foreign Policy and National Defence.

The Swedish people are at present engaged in intense discussions about the future. Demands and expectations are high. The background to this is their feeling of the shortcomings of the society. At the same time the discussion reflects a trust in the future and in our ability to solve the problems together. By experience we have learnt that practical and patient reform work leads to results.

We have different opinions as to the future and how it should be planned. One of the characteristics of a vital democracy is that opinions and evaluations differ. I will not now elaborate on the differences.

But even if we may hold different opinions on important questions, the intense debate does reflect our will to shape our society ourselves in accordance with our own evaluations. When we outline the future we assume that nothing will happen to upset these plans for the future. We count on a continuous rapid rate of progress and on community work in a democratic spirit. But we are also counting on enjoying continued peace.

It seems so obvious to us that the peace should last that we take it for granted. This is what really makes the democratic planning of the future endurable. Yet, we live with war and violence, conveyed to our retinas by the mass media. And yet, we must always prepare ourselves for the possibility that peace may be broken. That is why we have a total defence system. To say that peace is a prerequisite condition for our plans for the future is nothing but an accentuated way of expressing the aims of the security policy, which the Riksdag declared in 1968. For one thing, it stipulates that we shall endeavour to safeguard, in all situations and in such ways as we ourselves choose, the nation's freedom of action in order to maintain and develop, within our borders; our society politically, economically, socially and culturally and in all other respects according to our own evaluations. In this connection we shall work towards international detente and peaceful development.

The means to reach our security policy goals are primarily the foreign policy and the defence policy. These policies must be framed with due regard to the power policy situation and Sweden's strategic position.

The two Super Powers exercise a domineering influence on the world today. They oppose each other in two blocs. They are impelled by ideological, economic and strategic motives. Their interests clash also in our part of the world.

Sweden is a small country and our influence is limited. From an international point of view we have but small resources at our disposal. We cannot to any great extent count upon influencing the international environment in which we must live and upon which we are dependent. Therefore, we have to balance our efforts carefully. Therefore, we must in our valuations and in our actions proceed from the conditions which are at hand and adjust ourselves accordingly.

As the foundation of our foreign policy we have chosen freedom from alliances in peace-time with the object of neutrality in war. This expresses our lines of action in two different situations: when there is peace and when war has broken out in our part of the world. We do not join any military alliances. We keep away from all alliances in order to make our neutrality in war credible already in peace-time.

The policy of neutrality is trusted by the Swedish people. It has enabled us to live in peace. Our policy of neutrality has contributed to calm and stability in our part of the world.

All along the border between the Eastern and the Western blocs there has been continuous unrest, but not in the part bordering on Northern Europe. Sweden's policy of neutrality has played its part in this connection. It has now been generally admitted in Europe that our policy of neutrality is one of the factors which has served to keep Northern Europe relatively calm and stable.

In contrast to the Austrian policy of neutrality, the Swedish counterpart is not defined by agreements with other countries, nor is it embodied in the Constitution like the Swiss. We ourselves have framed our policy of neutrality and we ourselves carry the responsibility for its being respected and trusted by the rest of the world. Some people want to emphasize and sometimes exaggerate the difference between us and the other neutral countries. I consider that rather dangerous. Once, during a phase of the EEC negotiations, I became involved in a discussion with some Austrian and Swiss people about the differences or similarities of our policies of neutrality. We came to the conclusion that the similarities were predominant. It is completely irrelevant if we have an agreement with other countries or the

neutrality embodied in our Constitution; in any case, our policy of neutrality imposes obligations on us in regard to our foreign policy. It is fundamentally a question of the aim of this policy to inspire confidence in the stability of that policy in the surrounding world, be it embodied in the Constitution or not. There are also those who believe that the fact that our policy of neutrality has not been regularized by agreement, nor constitutionalized, means that this would give us more freedom of action and movement. This may be true in connection with certain defined questions such as the membership of the United Nations and exemption from consultation duty in certain situations. But, in general, this is a dangerous argument. For it does not give us the freedom to act in a way that would impair the credibility of our policy of neutrality in case of war. Therefore, a policy of neutrality demands firmness.

Primarily, the policy of neutrality emanates from our own needs. It is our own peace, our own independence and our own security that we want to safeguard. As it has been one of the prerequisites for our long peace it also gives us the best possibility to evade becoming involved in future armed conflicts. Whereas we ourselves thus want to shape our future according to our own evaluations, and whereas we must consider our own vital interests in our foreign policy we know at the same time that we cannot isolate ourselves from the rest of the world. The Swedish society is becoming more and more internationalized. This is a consequence of the rapidly increasing exchange of goods. It is connected with the increasing immigration which gives new cultural impulses to the Swedish society and which also gives more and more Swedes an opportunity to meet people from other environments in everyday life.

I have said earlier that internationalism starts on the other side of the mountain range to the West, the Åland Sea and the Sound. It is obvious that we primarily and

especially turn to our Nordic neighbours in matters of international co-operation. In this connection it is tempting to bring up the intense negotiations on expanded Nordic economic co-operation which have been going on during the last three-four days. But I assume that the Nordic interest among this audience is so obvious that there is no need for elaboration.

Our commitments in the United Nations and other international organizations increase our responsibility for making constructive contributions according to our capacity. During the 1970's our assistance to developing countries will increase rapidly. We must make people positively interested in this. Our discussions on assistance to developing countries will add to our interest in the problems of the world. This is really necessary if we want to make democratic decisions on future assistance to the poor countries.

For these reasons alone the policy of neutrality must not mean isolation.

Rightly it has been said that our position as a neutral nation gives us special opportunities for expressing, freely and without restraint, a wider international solidarity. We are not better informed or wiser than other nations. But we lack a colonial past. We do not have any power policy aspirations or any strategic interests in the world. Nor does our policy of non-alignment bind us to an ally by ties of loyalty.

The dreams and hopes which urge peoples in the world to demand national liberation and social justice are not unknown to us. The peoples who have been liberated in the years following the Second World War are, like us, small nations. Like us, they want to free themselves from the

division of the world into two blocs, a division which may jeopardize the attitudes and damage the international co-operation.

Meanwhile, the ability to understand other peoples' conditions is growing in our society. That kind of internationalism is nothing new. It is incorrect to attribute the capability of international solidarity to the young generation of today only. Earlier generations also reacted against violence and oppression. In Branting's generation it was the question of the autocratic powers of Europe, headed by Tsarist Russia. Per Albin Hansson and his generation witnessed the threat of Fascism and the petrification of Communism.

Now, the horizon has expanded.

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Simultaneously, we witness how the wealthy industrial countries which have not managed to solve their fundamental problems, are unable or fail to master the rapid technological development, to equalize the living conditions, to strengthen democracy.

In the 1920's and even in the 1930's there was enthusiasm - emanating from very different quarters - for the American society and the Soviet society. They both represented something new. In America came the New Deal. The enthusiasm was interpreted in America by Carl Sandburg: The common people always hold their own against their superiors. It takes time, but eventually, the people will win. - It was said about the people that "this anvil laughs at many a broken sledge". And Majovski wrote his famous poem about the Soviet passport: "I could, like a wolf, devour bureaucracy" ... "I hold out my passport with the hammer and the sickle - read and envy me: I am a citizen of the Soviet Union."

Nowadays, there are probably not many Russian authors who can hold out their passports. These countries are no longer the lodestars they were once. But they are exceedingly powerful and established.

Instead, the solidarity with the poor and oppressed peoples of the third world is growing. That does not imply uncritical acceptance of or responsibility for all parts of the policies of these countries. But it does mean an understanding of the demands and the difficulties which oppose them. In these times of implacable and often destructive technological development, in the wealthy societies with environment destruction and clefts between the social classes, states, like Tanzania or the liberation movements in various places, represent a new and meaningful ideality, chances which seem to have been lost in other parts of the world.

In our foreign policy we must not fail to interpret the growing interest in other peoples' conditions and the broadening international solidarity. This we do by expressing our opinions, by increasing assistance to the poor and war damaged peoples and by participating in the international co-operation - especially within the framework of the United Nations.

To express our opinions is nothing new to us. But the Great Powers have become more influential and have more commitments and they are therefore more keenly observed by the rest of the world.

Our policy of neutrality does not prevent us from expressing an opinion which disagrees with the views of the Great Powers. We have no special obligations to any particular states. We have to adhere to International Law and our own independent evaluations.

It is no wonder that our attitude to international questions may meet with criticism as well as appreciation from the international opinion. These attitudes do not reflect any hostility or intent to impair our relations with other states. We have an obvious interest in good relations with the Great Powers, inter alia, because they, to a great extent are in possession of the keys to the international co-operation.

We have criticized the war in Vietnam. It was then said that this was incompatible with a policy of neutrality. That I cannot understand. One may have different opinions of this war, one may, for instance, believe in the Domino theory, one may feel that this is a wise war in many respects, and so on. But if we express an opinion on this war it cannot be regarded as incompatible with the policy of neutrality only because it is a critical opinion. On the contrary, that would be a rather dangerous argument. During the post-war period we have several times criticized the policy of the Soviet Union, viz., the Prague coup in 1948, the events in Hungary in 1956, the Berlin wall, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. And we have strongly emphasized what we have found to be the attitude of the general Swedish opinion on these questions - even though some Swedes have been of a different opinion, even though the object for our criticism has not been too enthusiastic. Perhaps for the first time we have now plainly criticized the policy of the Western Great Power. We can hardly expect any enthusiasm. But it would be dangerous to maintain that we have broken our neutrality by criticizing some of the policy of the Western Great Power. The conclusion would then easily be that there are stipulations and conditions for our policy of neutrality, that it gives scope for criticizing the East but not the West. And then the world will no longer believe in the fundamental principles of our policy.



I will briefly refer to two difficulties in international relations to-day.

The two leading Great Powers have become enormously powerful and well established. We are in a situation which tends to become something like a duopoly in the world between the leading Great Powers. I will immediately add that this is not altogether a negative matter. They possess full knowledge of their enormous destructive potential. They both know that a military victory is impossible in the world of to-day. Of course, this gives them a special responsibility, which I do not for a moment doubt that they feel and this makes them very cautious. They are trying to remove all causes for a Great Power conflict. I have earlier said that they move like two big cats around each other. They have their interests all over the world and they are well aware that an open conflict between them would lead to mutual catastrophe. This means that the terror balance, which in fact exists, can be regarded as a fragile guarantee of peace.

On the other hand, there is the risk that a factual duopoly may come dangerously close to the interests of the smaller nations, viz., a duopoly may threaten their interests; in some cases by maintaining status quo when changes are essential for the future, in other cases by difficulties in solving international problems.

Obviously, the co-operation of the smaller powers in the peace work is essential. Even the Super Powers with their immense resources are often powerless. The small states must not by silence appear to approve of measures which they consider contrary to their interests and evaluations. They must oppose the rise of pressure groups and facilitate the disintegration of the military blocs. According to their capacity they must contribute, individually or in co-operation, to the construction of a fair and peaceful world order.

The second difficulty is the tension in the international co-operation between the desire for national independence and the factual increasing interdependence between the nations of the world.

The collapse of the old colonial system has resulted in a great number of new independent nations on the international stage. For most of them, the struggle for national liberty has been inseparably linked with the struggle for social liberty. In the United Nations and in other quarters, they demand as their right that the older and wealthier nations shall contribute to their development. There is hardly a more important task than the endeavour to establish a true fellowship between the wealthy world and the developing countries as well as the endeavour to gradually achieve, economic and social equality between all peoples and all nations. Meanwhile, the mutual interdependence has been increasing continuously. Cybernetics and space technique demonstrate the increasing speed of the development in this direction. It is true that the international society is still organized in a series of independent nations. According to International Law and the Charter of the United Nations all nations are sovereign and have the same rights. The political expression of the idea of sovereignty is nationalism. The small nations, especially the new young nations, look upon nationalism as a support for their endeavours to rally their own nation into loyal co-operation. Their efforts to substantiate the formal independence with a real economic and social content and to oppose pressure from foreign interests are obvious and natural.

But if we penetrate beyond to-day's horizon and put it in a wider perspective, the border lines between the states look like some rather haphazard lines on the earth's surface. The individual nation is and remains too narrow a framework for co-operation and progress. This perspective, however, defines

more clearly what one might call the fellowship of destiny between all inhabitants on earth, between all citizens of the world society which is bound to come some time.

From whatever basis one starts - the duopoly of the Great Powers and its hazards or the opposition between nationalism and internationalism, between the desire for independence and the factual, increasing interdependence between the countries - one finds that the great problems must be solved jointly through international co-operation between the countries.

Our policy of neutrality stands firm. We regard it as an asset for the 1970's. It means an opportunity to contribute towards constructive co-operation between the countries in solving central problems.

On the other hand, the policy of neutrality is not only a privilege. It also involves liabilities. I have mentioned some of these earlier. I will now deal with another.

It is not sufficient that we are non-allied and that we declare our desire to remain neutral in the event of war. One must also be able to trust that Swedish territory and Swedish resources will not be used for aggressive activities. These are very simple and concrete matters. One must be able to trust us to reject violations of Swedish territory, to protest against flights over Swedish territory, to guard our territorial waters and our ports. Thus, we cannot have any preparations or consultations on military co-operation with members of a Great Power alliance. If a war between the Great Powers were to break out we cannot even in a critical situation and under strong external pressure choose to join one of the belligerent countries. We must make the surrounding world trust in our ability to reject every operation which violates Swedish territory in war time. Otherwise, we will give rise to distrust or wrong hopes among the Great Powers.

To be able to achieve this, we must have a relatively strong defence. The defence is an instrument of our foreign policy. It strengthens the credibility of our foreign policy. On the other hand, it is only through a firm foreign policy that our defence can be made credible.

Sometimes the question arises whether it is of any real use for a small country like Sweden to have a military defence. The Great Powers are so immensely powerful and have at their disposal weapon resources with which we cannot compete. Our only chance of security would be to join a major defence organization.

Firstly, we would then quite certainly become involved in a future war.

Secondly, the actual power policy situation is important.

In Europe, there are now two power blocs opposing each other. There is a balance of power between these blocs. These two bind each others' forces. Their military resources are very similar. A conflict in our vicinity would be the result of a Great Power conflict. Any attack on our country must be regarded in this context. For Sweden does not represent an intrinsic value to any of the Great Power blocs.

In the event of an armed conflict, a Great Power must, inter alia, endeavour to prevent Sweden from becoming a base for the enemy.

But as the forces of the Great Powers bind each other, only limited resources can be used against us. It is these resources that we have to meet.

If the attitude of the Great Powers is influenced by credibility in our ability to safeguard our neutrality with the aid of our military defence we have a real opportunity to escape involvement in a future war. The conclusion of this is that our military defence is engaged in purely defensive activities, aimed at preserving the peace. From this it can also be concluded that our military defence will reject attacks from all quarters.

It is sometimes being said that our security depends on the proximity of the forces of this or that Great Power. The Warsaw Pact forces should prevent capitalistic imperialism from conquering Sweden. Or, inversely, NATO's forces would save us from Communist aggression. And we should take this into special consideration in our foreign policy evaluations.

I want to refute a conclusion of this kind simply because it very closely concerns the question of the credibility of the firmness of our chosen line of action. If we were to take these matters into consideration, we might raise hopes or distrust as to our real attitude in the event of a war between the Great Powers. Our influence on the international environment is very small. But it is in the interest of peace, as well as in accordance with our own expressed interests, to find an opening in Europe and remove the stalemate of the two military blocs. The prerequisite for this is a new European security policy. We are quite prepared to support a Conference on European security which we believe may lead to results if it is well prepared and if the Great Powers participate.

The Swedish military defence has been formed so as to enable us to stand up to attacks to which we may be subjected in a Great Power conflict, to stand up against the forces which a Great Power can allocate against Sweden. The economic defence is an indispensable part of our total defence. If

the economic defence and the civil defence are not sufficiently strong, the credibility of our ability to safeguard our neutrality in war will suffer. Much stamina is needed in the event of a blockade. It is, however, not only a question of our economic independence but also a question of how the provisions are to be distributed amongst the people. The urbanization which our country has experienced only after the Second World War makes special demands on the economic emergency planning, in parts dissimilar to the demands on the military defence. While a military unit may be moved fairly rapidly, the civilian population remains rather stationary. Then, problems such as storage space, transport systems and manpower come to the fore.

The guiding principles for the framing of the Swedish defence for the next few years were laid down by the Riksdag in 1968. Since then, nothing has happened to change the fundamental security policy evaluations which were the basis of the defence programme in 1968. The Swedish citizens are making comparatively big sacrifices in order to maintain a defence system. There are various ways of measuring what this sacrifice amounts to. It is sometimes being said that the share of military expenditure in the budget is one way of measuring. In my opinion that is unrealistic. If we decide to make an affective improvement of the old people's living conditions or if we decide to expand our school system and thus increase expenditure in these fields, this is in itself no argument for raising the cost of the military defence. Fortunately, comparisons of that kind are now obsolete. Another way is to compare the defence expenditure with the GNP. Calculations of that kind are being made. As far as Sweden is concerned, the share has dropped from about 5 % to 4%; there is a similar trend in several other countries.

As to the defence expenditure, counted per capita, we are quite far up on the list. Only the Americans and a few others are ahead of us. The defence expenditure per capita is in U.S.A. \$ 396, in Israel \$ 224, in Soviet \$ 169 and in Sweden \$ 128.

The next defence resolution will be passed in the spring, 1972, and come into force on July 1, the same year. In this connection a reorganization of the national defence planning is taking place, based on studies on the likely development of the international environment. On this basis the Commander-in-Chief studies possible operational attacks. These studies will form the basis for the framing of 15 year perspective plans. The concrete details are meant to be set down in consecutive 5-year plans. This is a new and fascinating outline of the long term national defence work.

In connection with the new defence resolution a new Committee on National Defence will be appointed. There will not be much material on the work, which is now going on, until the spring 1971, but the Committee on National Defence will nevertheless be appointed this autumn. That will give them ample time to plan their work.

Our national defence is built to safeguard our rights to shape our own society. The prospects must be such that the individual finds it purposeful to be loyal and take on the economic and other consequences, necessary for a strong national defence. If unity and solidarity is lacking in the society owing to growing gaps between the citizens and insecurity for the individual, the will to participate in a defence system may also waver.

The defence system must not become an enclave in the society, isolated from every-day life, excluded from the debate of the rest of the society. It would be unreasonable if the demands for an increased democracy in working life, in schools and universities should not be reflected in the defence system. It is one of our largest working places, one of our most expansive economic activities.

During the last few years there have been important changes aiming at a removal of the military and civilian differences which cannot be justified by the demands of the military training. Simplified rules for saluting have been introduced. Leisure time activities for the conscripts are being improved. The democracy at military units is being reformed, personnel welfare, leisure time and educational activities have been given increased grants. In the spring of 1970, the first Conscript Riksdag will take place under Government auspices. These are just a few examples.

If we manage to broaden our democracy in this way, the debate on the national defence will also become more intense. This we should all welcome.

The right of each nation to defend itself is embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Some maintain that we, contrary to all other countries, should waive this right. This is often said with a reference to the thesis that our country is not worth defending. It is true that our society is evil and unjust in many ways. I do agree on that. But surely, the conclusion of this argumentation would be that a potential aggressor occupying Sweden would carry out a policy, and take measures for removing class differences, strengthen democracy, etc. I cannot imagine a country, harbouring these ideals, which would be interested in attacking Sweden. And with that, the whole argument of the country not being worth defending seems illogical to me. If we were to waive the



right to defend ourselves we would also renounce the possibility to maintain neutrality in a future war. And our attitudes in peace-time could always be assailable by the argument that we in fact endeavoured to coordinate our policy with that of a Great Power when faced with an armed conflict. We could be accused of opportunism, however sincere we might be.

Others maintain that we shall and must defend ourselves but that it could be done by other means than the present ones. This is a serious point of view. Partisan defence and various kinds of civilian resistance become important means of defence if we, nevertheless, were to be occupied. But our conventional military defence is a military defence against invasion. If we were to abandon that and direct our attention towards guerilla warfare against the occupation, we shall then have given up any hope of not becoming involved in the war. The determining factor is the appraisal of the situation by a potential Great Power.

And it should be a warning to those with ideas of this kind that the countries which have organized and made a success of guerilla or partisan warfare - Yugoslavia, Cuba, Algeria - have all, at the moment of their victory organized a defence system which is not in any way adapted to partisan warfare but is, instead, a defence intended to guard the borders of the country against invasion.

There are also young people who, for personal reasons, would experience keen remorse if they were to be forced to use arms against other people. We have expressed our respect for such a serious personal conviction in our conscientious objector legislation.

The discussions about our defence and the demands for a so-called "positive peace" does, of course, reflect concern about the future if the present development goes on. And this concern is justified.

We can say that the 1960's was a decade which was characterized by a powerful increase in the total military armament. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute states in its recently published year-book that the armament expenditure in the world began to rise sharply in 1965. During the subsequent three years, the military expenditure in the world increased by nearly 30%. This fact gives cause for many comments. It is sufficient to say that this increase is probably more rapid than the growth of foodstuffs, necessary for feeding the world population. The comparison says a lot about the state of the world to-day. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute says about the military armament: "This is a formidable rate of increase, not very different from that which preceded the First World War, though still a good deal less than the increase in the years before the Second World War." United States military expenditure in the Vietnam war accounts for a good part of this rise. But the Warsaw Pact powers have also increased their resources. How far this is in reaction to the increase in United States spending is hard to say states the SIPRI report. The armament wave of the Warsaw Pact powers occurred after the American, but it may have been the result of decisions taken some years earlier.

The NATO and Warsaw Pact countries account for 85% of world military expenditure. But rearmament also takes place outside the big power blocs. In the Middle East, military expenditure has been increasing by 13 % a year for twenty years, and has accelerated during the last few years. The countries in this area have a population of less than 100 millions, but they are now spending more for military purposes

than the whole of Latin America with 250 million, and more than South Asia (India and Pakistan) with a population of 600 million. In Africa military expenditure is rising by 7% - 8% a year. This is about the general rate of increase in military expenditure in the developing countries. There are only two areas outside the military blocs where the military expenditure has been moderate. One of these is Latin America. This is generally called the continent of revolutions and military dictatorships. There, as Sven Lindkvist pointed out, the state of affairs is that to a great extent the Army has domestic policy duties. But rearmament is taking place also in this part of the world, in Argentina and Peru, for example. The other area with a small increase in military expenditure is made up of the European countries outside the military pacts. Sweden belongs to this group.

In 50 years, armament expenditure of the world has been doubled ten times, in neat terms. Total world production has increased only half as rapidly. Thus, mankind now spends twice as much of their total resources for military purposes than they did immediately before the First World War. Some years ago, an American organization reported that world military expenditure equalled the total income produced in one year by one milliard people living in Latin America, South Asia and the Middle East. The military expenditure is 40% greater than world expenditure on education, more than three times greater than expenditure on public health.

But surely there must be an economic limit to an armament race. It is obvious that the military expenditure cannot continue infinitely to increase its share of world resources. The present share will, however, be sufficient for continued rearmament. If world production continues to increase at the present rate and military expenditure keeps its share of it, the armament costs will be doubled every 15 years.

It is not the first time we find something like a milestone on the road of the armament race. There is a relative balance of power between the Great Powers. Of course, a balance of power does not mean that their resources are sufficient to strike the opponent a devastating blow. George Wald said that the explosive force of the Great Powers is big enough for 15 tons of TNT for each individual in the world - men, women and children. Secondly, these resources, vast as they may be, are yet insufficient for a so-called "pre-emptive strike", viz. the ability to defeat the opponent's chances of hitting back by being the first to attack. But none of the Great Powers possesses this strength.

And these two simple facts constitute the basis of the balance of power or the parity which we often talk about. This is the situation to-day. But we are probably now on the verge of a new and even more expensive weapons development. Consequently, a choice must be made. There are several strong reasons for stopping the armament race now, even in view of the interests of the Super Powers. One reason is the enormously increasing expenditure which I have mentioned. As a result of the intense research and development work, the weapon arsenals soon become obsolete. This, in its turn, leads to a new factual insecurity as it is a fact that the more effective the weapons become, the less security will there be for the Super Powers themselves as well as for the rest of the world. One could call it one of the absurdities of the world situation to-day that the more powerful the Great Powers become, and the more strength they get, the more does their uncertainty and insecurity increase.

The new weapons systems - be it the defensive ABM or the offensive MIRV or FOBS, - would imply that one party, more easily than before, would be able to gain a temporary advantage, thereby eliminating the opponent's chances

of retaliating and thus upset the so-called "terror balance". This is what they perpetually fear. They fear the blunder of the last move.

In the 1950's, the Americans believed that they had been caught in a so-called "missile gap". This turned out to be incorrect, but it was the beginning of a tremendous rearmament effort. In the beginning of the 1960's rumours were spread that the Russians had worked out a so-called "ABM system" in order to protect Moscow. This led the Americans to enlarge their own system and also to develop the so-called "MIRV (Multiple Individually Targetable Reentry Vehicle)". The name in itself is terrifying enough if one has time to pronounce it. It is an offensive weapon, aimed at striking a blow at the opponent's launchers for guided missiles. Then the question arose whether the Russians might also be developing a MIRV system. And the Safeguard system was developed, the object of which was protection against such a development. This is an amateurish way of summing up a complicated reality. But the fundamental problems seem to be: will these immensely intricate systems really function on the day when they are put into action? This was a permanently recurring theme of the former American Minister of Defence, McNamara. The second question is: what may the opponent be preparing? To these questions the answer is that the systems will perhaps not function but, to be on the safe side, we must take precautionary measures. In any case, we must continuously study the activities of our opponent, and we must proceed on the alternative "if the worst comes to the worst". This leads to a situation where political provocations are no longer the driving force, but sudden new technological inventions, challenges leading to very clearly calculated counter-moves by the other party at a steadily increasing pace.

Some days ago, I read a fantastic argumentation. The American missile system in the U.S.A. is spread out on

bases all over America. If there is a Russian system, capable of destroying these bases, one must have time for making the counter-moves before the arrival of the opponent's missiles. The Americans are discussing the means of introducing an automatic system by which their missiles will be released at the very moment when a big attack against the missile bases seems to have been launched. This means that Judgement Day would be released by a decision made by computers. It is a somewhat terrifying prospect.

This way of reasoning confirms President Kennedy's words when he said that "the risks connected with disarmament fade in comparison with the definite danger of a continued armament race". This is something which concerns all of us who are dependent on the technological development in the world. We are approaching an age of hegemony for the Super Powers; a hegemony which automatically follows on their technological superiority. As far as weapons are concerned the hegemony is already that complete that no other country would dream of competing. And this is True wherever a new technology breaks through. Alva Myrdal has often called attention to these facts in various international contexts. Only the two Super Powers can reach the riches hidden on the ocean floor and the sea-bed. Only they can extract oil from the depths and blast out giant ports by means of nuclear explosions. Only they can organize complete systems of telecommunication satellites by which their messages soon can reach every individual home on the earth. This hegemony of the Super Powers is a danger to all small countries. As a neutral country we have special reasons for paying attention to this fact.

What is required in all fields is an international control system with an international administration to prevent nationalistic or monopoly interests from causing new conflicts and to make it possible that the new resources are put at the disposal of all countries. In these questions we try to take initiatives to promote a practical and functional internationalism.

In November last year, the United States and the Soviet Union opened their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The world had long been waiting for that to happen. One can, of course, say that the SALT discussions have been going on for several years in the form of official statements and, no doubt, also by private talks between Americans and Russians. Already three years ago, President Johnson and Prime Minister Kosygin agreed to endeavour to reach a settlement of the strategic arms systems. Not until now have the Americans and the Russians been able to sit down at the conference table. In the meantime, a terrifying development of the weapons technique has been taking place. Consequently, there is more and more to disarm. We should also keep in mind that the present negotiations between the Super Powers are only what they have expressively pledged themselves to do in an international agreement. I am referring to <sup>the</sup> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, recently ratified by Sweden.

One of our motives - as well as the motive of other non-nuclear countries - for supporting this Treaty is that the parties have pledged themselves to continue negotiations on an urgent termination of the armament race and an disarmament. As everybody knows, it was the non-nuclear countries who made the essential undertakings to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by renouncing nuclear weapons. Now the time has come for the nuclear weapon countries to make their contribution.

The preliminary talks lasted for more than a month in strict secrecy. We know very little about what the two delegations said to each other and how they tackled the problems. They agreed to resume the negotiations in Vienna in April. To begin with, we can possibly hope that negotiations of this kind may generate some degree of confidence between the parties and a reasonable understanding of the opponent's intentions, and this, per se, would act as a restraint on future armament activity. The

continued negotiations will prove that the Super Powers really intend to limit their own armaments, not only those of others. As for Sweden, we have for a long time pointed out how important it is that these negotiations should take place. Now that this has happened we welcome the SALT negotiations as a first step in the right direction and a sign of the relaxation of tension which the world needs.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has recently declared that the 1970's shall be a Disarmament Decade. If the continued negotiations lead to positive results, the U.N. resolution may come true. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is expected to come into force in the near future. The disarmament conference in Geneva will open their annual negotiations in a few weeks time and there too we may hope for some progress. Our country will not tire of insisting on far-reaching demands for international disarmament, but, as we have done so far, we want to do so by submitting practical and thoroughly prepared proposals. We are now primarily interested in concrete measures to ban the biological and chemical means of warfare, to safeguard the ocean floor and the sea-bed from armaments and other national restrictions, and, eventually, put an end to the test series of new and even more diabolical nuclear weapons.

I have here given you a short summary of the fundamental principles of Swedish foreign policy and the necessity of a proportionately strong national defence as an instrument for our foreign policy. At the same time I have wanted to put our foreign policy and defence into a somewhat broader international perspective. I have never been a supporter of the idea that an isolated disarmament would have some kind of proliferation effect. But I do believe that the field of disarmament is one of the fields in which Sweden can make constructive contributions on an international level. And we should always



consider our own national defence efforts in the possible perspective of international disarmament. The armanent race is a sad perspective. And the international dissensions give no cause for a careless optimism. All the same there are, of course, hopeful signs. We can see them in our own part of the world, in the dialogue between the Super Powers, in the efforts to achieve disarmament, and in people's increasing engagement in the cause for a wider international solidarity and understanding. By our attitudes and our commitments we have demonstrated our will to contribute towards peace and an international legal order. These contributions have always been and will always be of but of marginal importance in the big context. But there shall be no need to doubt our intentions and our determination. And there, our defence policy and our foreign policy and their unification possess a strength in their firm anchorage in the popular movements which still manage and I hope will continue also in the future to interest so many people in this country.

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